The committee, which has the equivalent two-star generals from the Air Force and Navy, as well as three nominees each from other services as members, is to identify the various types of vigilante and civilian volunteer groups that currently operate in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states that have been under a state of emergency since last year, and examine their modus operandi.
It is also to suggest the appropriate agency, other than the military, under whose control and authority the vigilantes can be placed, to free the army to concentrate its resources more on counterterrorism operations. The vigilantes have been of valuable aid to regular soldiers in the early stage of their emergence in identifying suspected Boko Haram insurgents to the authorities.
Members of the Civilian JTF were largely credited with forcing the insurgents out of the townships and into the forest and mountains. But they paid a heavy price too, because they became targets of Boko Haram, which has killed scores of them in the last couple of years. Organising them into a disciplined fighting force is one of the terms of reference of the committee.
The proposal, to eventually recruit some 10,000 members of the vigilante groups to perform military functions without necessarily being members of the armed forces, is fraught with dangers. Because they are not trained and are ill-equipped, their activities have been characterised by human rights abuses, although it is thought that the new measure would help maintain some level of discipline and greater control of their operations for the good of the counterinsurgency partnership.
Critical in the committee’s work would be to stress that any volunteers deemed fit must be thoroughly screened with a view to weeding out undesirable elements.
There is no doubt that the vigilantes have shown zeal, determination and courage in resisting the insurgents; so regulating their activities on issues of discipline and weapons handling would be indispensable. Because they have been useful in the past, their knowledge of the terrain will be an intelligence asset to the military. In any case, the security forces can do with additional men, especially if the prospective entrants are well-trained and appropriately equipped.
The authorities must consider that the Boko Haram insurgency is an aberration that will peter out with the right combination of political and military measures. For this reason, the military must also be proactive in planning long-term rehabilitation for members of the vigilantes when the insurgency is eventually defeated, or at least contained.
The government must have taken into consideration the need to beef troop strength up by co-opting members of the vigilantes into its fight against the insurgents, but it should ensure that mechanisms are put in place to ensure that the vigilantes are properly disarmed, demobilized, rehabilitated and re-integrated into the society after the war against terror in Nigeria is over.
This will also avoid the possibility of some of them being converted into militias by unscrupulous politicians or even some taking to violent crimes in the future.
Because not all the volunteers are likely to be taken care of under the proposed arrangement, the government should make a contingency plan to provide jobs, education and skills acquisition programmes for those who may be left out. This would minimise the tendency that in trying to solve one problem, a more monstrous one is unwittingly created.
